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To control pharmaceutical spending and improve access, the U.S. could adopt strategies similar
to those introduced in Germany by the 2011 German Pharmaceutical Market Reorganization Act.
In Germany, manufacturers sell new drugs immediately upon receiving marketing approval.
During the first year, the German Federal Joint Committee assesses new drugs to determine their
added medical benefit. It assigns them a score indicating its added benefit. New drugs
comparable to drugs in a reference price group are assigned to that group and receive the same
reimbursement, unless they are therapeutically superior. The National Association of Statutory
Health Insurance Funds then negotiates with manufacturers the maximum reimbursement
starting the 13th month, consistent with the drug’s added benefit assessment and price caps in
other European countries. In the absence of agreement, an arbitration board sets the price.
Manufacturers accept the price resolution or exit the market. Thereafter, prices generally are not
increased, even for inflation. U.S. public and private insurers control prices in diverse ways but
typically obtain discounts by designating certain drugs as preferred and by restricting patient
access or charging high copayment for non-preferred drugs. This article draws ten lessons for
drug pricing reform in U.S. federal programs and private insurance.
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Introduction

ev

In 1990, Germany and the U.S. per capita outpatient pharmaceutical spending were very
similar, with the United States having slightly lower spending: $259 in Germany and $251 in the
United States. By 2016, per capita outpatient pharmaceutical spending had risen only to $777 in
Germany but increased to $1208 in the United States (see Figure 1).1 In terms of Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development countries, per capita pharmaceutical spending in
Germany was among the highest. Only Switzerland and the U.S. have higher per capita spending
in 2018.1 As the U.S. considers ways to better control pharmaceutical spending and prices while
ensuring access to innovative therapies, it can learn from Germany, which in 2011 put in place
significant reforms.2
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Figure 1: Per Capita Spending on Outpatient Pharmaceuticals 19882018 in Constant $USD: U.S.A & Germany with growth rates

The German Drug Pricing System
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In Germany, all individuals must be insured through a statutory or private health insurer.3
About 90% of the German population (~75 million) are members of one of the 103 independent
statutory health insurers.4 The remainder purchase insurance through one of 45 private health
insurers.5 The German Social Code - Book V (Sozialgesetzbuch Fünftes Buch or SGB V) sets
rules for the governance of statutory health insurance, including setting premiums and
copayments.6

Pr

Statutory health insurance, largely financed by premiums paid by employers and
employees, is based on the solidarity principle: Every person receives all medically necessary
benefits irrespective of their insurance premiums, income, or health risks.7 A majority of people,
including most employees, students and the unemployed, are covered by a statutory health
insurer.8 Most full-time, self-employed workers purchase private insurance,9 which is primarily
financed through insurance premiums.
3
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The German Pharmaceutical Market Reorganization Act
Arzneimittelmarktneuordnungsgesetz (AMNOG) created a pricing system designed to curb
insurance reimbursed drug spending.10–13 Since it came into effect on January 1, 2011, drugs
with new active substances are evaluated to determine maximum reimbursement for all health
insurers and promote competition.10,14 New active substances (“new drugs”) are active
substances whose effects are not generally known at the time of marketing authorization and
require prescriptions.15,16
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The German Federal Joint Committee (Gemeinsamer Bundesausschuss) (G-BA) is
responsible for assessing new drugs.17 The G-BA, the highest decision-making body of the selfgoverned health care system, issues guidelines specifying what services are reimbursed by
statutory health insurance.18,19 Voting representatives from key stakeholders, including
representatives of the National Association of Statutory Health Insurance Funds (GKVSpitzenverband), the German Hospital Society, the National Association of Statutory Health
Insurance Physicians, the National Association of Statutory Health Insurance Dentists, and
impartial members, make up the G-BA.20 It also includes non-voting representatives of patient
advocacy organizations.21
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The G-BA typically commissions the independent Institute for Quality and Efficiency in
Health Care Institut für Qualität und Wirtschaftlichkeit im Gesundheitswesen (IQWiG) to assess
the new drug.22 [FN1]The manufacturer is advised which drug or other therapy is the appropriate
comparator for the evaluation.23 IQWiG then compares the new drug to the most appropriate
comparator therapy (zweckmäßige Vergleichstherapie) based on evidence supplied in the
manufacturer’s dossier, including data from all clinical trials.24,a IQWiG determines whether the
new drug has added medical benefit (medizinischer Zusatznutzen),17,25 and more specifically,
whether it is therapeutically superior, the same as, or inferior to the comparator. It ranks drugs on
a six-point scale. The G-BA reviews the IQWiG report, as well as comments made by
manufacturers and other stakeholders.26 After review, the G-BA can modify its recommendation
and renders a final decision.27
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The GKV-Spitzenverband, which constitutes the umbrella organization of statutory health
insurers, and the manufacturer negotiate the maximum reimbursement, consistent with the GBA’s decision.28 If they fail to reach an agreement, an arbitration board sets the maximum
reimbursement.29 The maximum reimbursement price also applies to private insurers and selfpaying patients.10,28 The GKV-Spitzenverband also sets maximum reimbursement for drugs in
reference price groups, including pharmacologically-therapeutically comparable drugs.30–32
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Germany’s pharmaceutical pricing is characterized by six key elements discussed below.
(see, Figure 3: Key Elements of the German’s Drug Pricing System, and Figure 4: Timeline for
Assessing New Drugs and Negotiating Prices)
1) Free pricing for one year ensures rapid access, during which time a new drug is assessed,
and there is negotiation to set the maximum reimbursement thereafter.

Pr

Prior to AMNOG, when the German parliament debated reforming pricing policies,
legislators considered the trade-off between rapid market access and controlling spending. Critics
of regulation argued capping prices would delay access to new therapies and discourage research
and development.33 Others maintained that without controls, manufacturers can set monopoly
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prices due to patents, and prices do not usually reflect a drug’s medical benefit.33 AMNOG
struck a compromise. To ensure rapid access to new drugs, AMNOG allows manufacturers to
sell new drugs without price regulation upon receiving marketing approval. Free launch pricing
with guaranteed coverage ensures that manufacturers typically market in Germany before, or at
the same time, as other European countries, and that patients have immediate access to new
medicines.34 There are good grounds to question the value of rapid access to all new drugs before
they are assessed to determine whether they have added benefit since studies reveal that
approximately half of new drugs lack added therapeutic benefit in Germany and studies in other
countries also indicate a large proportion of new drugs lack added therapeutic benefit.”35,36
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During the first year a new drug is marketed, the G-BA compares it to the most
appropriate comparator therapy. For drugs with added benefits, the GKV-Spitzenverband and the
manufacturer negotiate the maximum reimbursement to begin 1 year after market launch,
typically referred to as reaching a price resolution.28,37 If they fail to reach an agreement, an
arbitration board sets the maximum reimbursement.29 The arbitration board (which includes 2
representatives of each side, a neutral chair, and 2 other neutrals),38 sets whatever maximum
reimbursement it determines is appropriate.29 Manufacturers must accept the arbitration board
reimbursement or exit the market and forgo all German sales. The maximum reimbursement
does not typically increase. New negotiations are possible if 1 of the parties terminates the
contract, or if the G-BA conducts a new assessment and finds that the drug has greater added
benefit than its initial assessment.39 In that case, the GKV-Spitzenverband can negotiate a new
price with the manufacturer.

ot

From 2011 to 2017, the GKV-Spitzenverband reached price resolutions on 186 new
drugs. Of these, 122 were negotiated agreements and 21 were set by arbitration. 40 Since
AMNOG, 30 drugs have been withdrawn from the market after 1 year.40 Exiting the market is
often associated with drugs receiving a negative benefit assessment.40,41
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2) Drugs that are pharmacologically therapeutically comparable to drugs in a reference
price group are evaluated and priced in relation to such drugs.
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Manufacturers of new drugs that are pharmacologically therapeutically comparable to
drugs in a reference price group have to prove that they are therapeutically superior to drugs in
the group or they are assigned to the reference price group and receive the same price as all drugs
in the group.42 There are distinct reference price groups for drugs that have the same active
substances, pharmacologically therapeutically comparable active substances and comparable
therapeutic effects.43 Reference price group drugs constitute 80% of prescriptions and represent
about 40% of sales under statutory health insurance.44
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When establishing reference group prices, the GKV-Spitzenverband must ensure that
supplies are generally sufficient, appropriate, of good quality, and economical.30 A complex
formula guarantees that each reference price group will include at least 1 drug that is fully
reimbursed, so the public will not be required to pay more than the token five to ten euro
copayment.45,46,b Patients who select a drug priced higher than the reference price, however, pay
the difference between the selling price and the reference price.47 Consequently, manufacturers
have an incentive to lower their prices to no more than the reference price and, in fact, about
84% of manufacturers’ selling prices are at or below the reference price.12
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Figure 2: Key Elements of the German’s Drug Pricing System

1) In order to make new drugs available without delay, manufacturers have
immediate market access without reimbursement controls for one year.
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2) During the first year, the German Federal Joint Committee (Gemeinsamer
Bundesausschuss or G-BA) evaluates new drugs. Drugs that are
pharmacologically-therapeutically comparable to drugs in a reference price group
are assigned to the reference price group and receive the reference group
reimbursement, unless they prove they are therapeutically superior. Manufacturers
can set prices higher than reimbursement, in which case patients pay the
difference. However, the reimbursement price is set such that patients always have
the choice of at least one drug that will not cost more than reimbursed.

pe

3) Drugs not pharmacologically-therapeutically comparable to drugs in a reference
price group are assessed on a six-point scale in relation to their comparator therapy
to determine whether they offer added medical benefit. The G-BA usually
commissions the independent Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care
(Institut für Qualität und Wirtschaftlichkeit im Gesundheitswesen or IQWiG) to
evaluate the new drug and make a recommendation, which the G-BA usually
follows.
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4) The assessment of a drug’s added medical benefit sets parameters within which the
National Association of Statutory Health Insurance Funds (GKV-Spitzenverband)
and the manufacturer negotiate the maximum reimbursement to begin 13 months
after product launch. If they cannot agree, an arbitration board sets the maximum
reimbursement.

rin

5) New drugs that have added medical benefit are reimbursed at higher levels than the
comparator therapy at a price that takes account of amounts paid by other
European countries. Unless there is proof that the new drug has added benefit, the
new drug price cannot result in higher annual therapy costs than the comparator
therapy. Drugs that have less benefit than the comparator must have lower annual
therapy costs than the comparator.
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6) To ensure patient access without economic hardship, copayments for prescription
drugs are low (maximum of €10).
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Figure 3: Timeline for Assessing New Drugs and Negotiating Prices
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3) New drugs not assigned to reference price group are assessed in relation to a comparator
drug. The independent assessment of each new drug’s added medical benefit establishes
parameters for setting its maximum reimbursement.
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The G-BA assesses each new drug17 in relation to the appropriate comparator therapy25 and
ranks its added medical benefit. Manufacturers must convince the G-BA that a new drug has
greater benefit than the therapy to which it is compared to obtain higher reimbursement. 48
Typically, rather than evaluate the new drug itself, the G-BA commissions the IQWiG to
evaluate the new drug and make a recommendation,15,25,49 which the G-BA usually follows.15
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The G-BA ranks new drugs on a 6-point added-benefit scale denoting the extent to which
the new drug improves health status, shortens the duration of illness, extends survival, reduces
side effects, or improves the quality of life compared to the comparator therapy (see Figure
4).50,51 The top 3 ranks designate a new drug has (1) major, (2) considerable, or (3) minor added
benefit.52 The fourth rank specifies that the new drug’s added benefit is not quantifiable due to
data limitations.53 The fifth rank indicates there is no evidence that the new drug yields added
benefit.54 The sixth rank stipulates that the drug has less benefit than its comparator therapy.55 If
the G-BA finds that there is added benefit (ranks 1–4), it assesses its probability in a three-point
scale: hint, indication, or proof.56,c In general, the probability is ranked based on the reliability of
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the information.57 For example, hint is usually given in the case of a small study or a study with
relevant uncertainties, whereas indication is generally issued in the case of a solid, larger study.57
The rank proof is associated with 2 or more studies or at least 1 very large and high-quality
study.57, 58 The drug’s rank can affect the reimbursement price set by negotiation between the
GKV-Spitzenverband and the manufacturer.
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The G-BA ranking is based on all the evidence in the manufacturer dossier without use of
an algorithm.24,59,60 It makes a positive assessment (ranks 1-4) if a drug produces an added
benefit for any patient subgroup.15,61 The manufacturer has the burden of proof, except in certain
cases, such as for orphan drugs and antibiotics reserved for use as a last resort for multidrugresistant organisms.62,63,d If the manufacturer fails to submit the required evidence, in time or in
full, the added benefit is deemed unproven.64 The G-BA provides key stakeholders, such as the
pharmaceutical firms concerned, representatives of associations of pharmacists, physicians, and
special therapists, an opportunity to comment on the benefit assessment before it makes a final
decision.26 Through their comments, stakeholders can influence the G-BA’s assessment.

2)
Considerable
Added
Benefit

Sustained and
previously
unattained
major
improvement
in the therapy.

Previously
unattained
significant
improvement
in the therapy.

3)
Minor
Added Benefit
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1)
Major
Added
Benefit
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Figure 4
The Added-Benefit Scale
Ranking Added Benefit of New Drugs
In Relation to the Appropriate Comparator
(Section 5(7) of the AM-NutzenV)*
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Previously
unattained
moderate
improvement
in the therapy.

4)
Added Benefit
Not
Quantifiable

Available
scientific data
does not allow
quantification.

5)
No Evidence
of Added
Benefit
No proven
added benefit.

6)
Less Benefit
than the
Comparator
Less benefit
than
comparator
therapy.
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* The benefit assessment considers the extent to which the new drug improves health status, shortens the
duration of illness, extends survival, reduces side effects, or improves the quality of life compared to the
comparator therapy; see Section 2(3) and (4) of the AM-NutzenV.

4) New drugs are reimbursed at a higher price than their comparator only if they have
added medical benefit.
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The price of new drugs takes account of the drug rank on the G-BA’s 6-point scale.65 The
maximum reimbursement for new drugs with added medical benefit (those ranked 1-4) is set by
confidential negotiation66 between the GKV-Spitzenverband and the manufacturer in line with a
framework agreement signed by the GKV-Spitzenverband and certain associations, including
those of pharmaceutical manufacturers.48 Such drugs receive a higher price than their
8
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comparator. No algorithm specifies how much higher the price will be than the comparator,
however, so the GKV-Spitzenverband and manufacturer exercise discretion in resolving the
price.59 For drugs with no evidence of added benefit (rank 5), maximum reimbursement cannot
lead to higher annual therapy costs than the comparator therapy.65,67 For drugs with less benefit
than the comparator therapy (rank 6), reimbursement must be less than the annual costs of the
comparator therapy.68
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For drugs with added medical benefit, the maximum reimbursement is a function of 4
factors: (1) the degree of a drug’s added benefit; (2) the annual therapy costs of comparator
drugs; (3) reimbursement for the drug in 15 countries (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Greece, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Sweden, Slovakia,
Spain, and Czech Republic); and (4) the manufacturer’s dossier.69,70 The GKV-Spitzenverband
attempts to set a maximum reimbursement that is not higher than the maximum reimbursement
in other European countries, unless setting it higher is justified by sales volume, the economic
means of the reference price countries, and other factors. When setting the maximum
reimbursement price, the GKV-Spitzenverband asks manufacturers to reveal confidential
discounts it offers to insurers in other countries, making adjustments if the manufacturers do not
provide this information or if the information provided is not credible.71
5) Germany employs manufacturer and pharmacy discounts.
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All statutory health insurers receive from manufacturers a statutory discount from
manufacturers, set at 7% of sales price (excluding value-added tax) for patented drug72 and 6%
for generics.73 Insurers also receive an additional discount of 10% for generics.74 Drugs assigned
to reference price groups are exempt from the 6% discount.75 The percentage discount for
generic drugs in reference price groups varies with the drug’s sales price.
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Furthermore, individual insurers can negotiate additional discounts with the manufacturers. 76
In 2015, total discounts surpassed 10% of statutory health insurance pharmaceutical
expenditures, > €3 billion.77,78 Manufacturers often offer such discounts in return for purchasing
high volumes.
6) Germany ensures that patients will not be economically burdened and avoids restrictions
on access.

ep

rin

Germany’s commitment to social solidarity is evidenced by removing access barriers to
medical care through statutory health insurance. Drugs used in hospitals are fully covered.2
Health insurance, both statutory and private, finances about 84% of outpatient pharmaceutical
expenditures.2 The remainder is paid as patient copayments and uncovered over-the-counter
medication.2

Pr

Additionally, Germany restricts consumer copayments. Patients pay 10% of the sales
price for each drug pack, with a minimum payment of €5 and a maximum payment of €10, even
for the most expensive medicines.45 Copayment are never more than the actual sale price.45
Children under the age of 18 are exempt.45 The GKV-Spitzenverband also pays for over-thecounter medicines for children under 12 years and those with developmental disorders under 18
years.45
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Germany today avoids rationing medical services through budgets or physician incentives
to control pharmaceutical spending, but this has not always been the case. Germany enacted
legislation in the 1990s that made physicians bear part of the cost when total pharmaceutical
spending exceeded a budget. Policymakers anticipated that if physicians bore financial risk for
drug spending, they would be more frugal when prescribing medicines, total spending would be
reduced, and perhaps pharmaceutical prices as well. However, limits on overall spending have
been abolished in Germany since 2002.79
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The 1993 Health Care Structure Act set limits on overall spending. In the event that
actual spending exceeded the budget, regional physician associations were supposed to make
clawback payments retroactively reducing their compensation.79,80 However, in 1996, physician
associations that exceeded their budgets refused to make payments.79,80 The 1997 Second
Statutory Health Insurance Restructuring Act abolished regional physician association spending
caps from 1998 and replaced it with spending targets for physician specialties.79,80 The legislation
set a target for spending no >125% of the budget. If any physician spending exceeded its target,
the physician had to submit information justifying the overspending. Physicians would need to
pay back the difference if their justifications were rejected.79,80

pe

The 1998 Act to Strengthen Solidarity in Statutory Health Insurance reintroduced
regional collective spending caps for physician drug spending starting in 1999.79,80 The 2001
Pharmaceutical Budget Redemption Act reabolished the spending caps.79,80
Comparison to the U.S.

ot

The United States lacks a uniform pharmaceutical pricing policy. No designated
institution assesses the therapeutic value of all new drugs. No national policy caps purchase
prices, patient reimbursement, or spending. Manufacturers set launch prices and generally can
increase them at will. Each private insurer independently negotiates discounts. There are several
separate policies for governmental programs. Uninsured Americans lack the discounts available
to the insured.
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Private insurers typically employ pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) to manage their
formularies and negotiate discounts. PBMs obtain rebates from manufacturers for insurers in
return for including drugs in its formulary and/or by designating products as a preferred drug,
which increases sales by removing access barriers. Patients choosing nonpreferred drugs pay
higher copayments and often must secure authorization for their use. Sometimes, patients cannot
be reimbursed for a nonpreferred drug unless they have already tried a preferred drug without
clinical success.81

ep

Insurers pay PBMs a share of rebates and fees for their work. PBMs also earn fees from
manufacturers, pharmacies, and other parties. Financing PBMs are characterized by conflicts of
interest, and further, the grounds for formulary choices lack transparency. Critics contend that
PBM policies reduce patient choice, limit access, and diminish the value of rebates they earn for
insurers. Even worse, they create incentives for manufacturers to raise list prices. 82,83
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The federal government employs separate policies for each of its various programs.
Medicaid provides insurance for individuals with low income; the income eligibility level
depending on whether the state opts for expanded coverage under the Affordable Care or sets its
own income eligibility level. The individual’s age, gender, and other variables also affect income
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eligibility.84 Medicaid obtains drug rebates in return for including all of a manufacturer’s
products in its formulary, even when there are lower cost alternatives. Purchasers agree to sell
drugs at the lower of either: (1) the best price the manufacturer offers to other purchasers (with
certain exceptions)85 or (2) a 23.1% discount from the average manufacturer price for branded
drugs and a 13% discount for generics.86 Legislation also restricts price increases greater than
inflation. Manufacturers must rebate Medicaid for price increases that exceed the rate of
inflation, capped at 100% of the average manufacturer price.87 The Affordable Care Act capped
the total Medicaid inflation rebates at 100% of a drug’s average market price. However, the
American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 will, starting in 2024, cap all price increase exceeding
inflation.88 Furthermore, participating states can adopt additional policies to obtain discounts.
Forty-seven states negotiate supplemental rebates, typically by designating a manufacturer’s
products as preferred drugs.88
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The Veteran’s Administration typically negotiates greater discounts than Medicaid
because it can exclude drugs from its formulary.90 When it does not negotiate separate discounts,
the Veteran’s Administration can purchase drugs at the same price as Medicaid.

pe

Medicare covers virtually all Americans over age 65. It also covers people under 65 who
have amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, or receive Social Security Disability Insurance, or after two
years of onset of end-stage renal disease.91 Medicare has distinct policies for drugs used in
hospitals and for drugs used outside of hospitals. Drugs purchased outside of hospitals are
financed through Medicare Part D, meaning the federal government cannot set pricing rules for
these medications.92 Multiple private insurers administer Medicare Part D. Each constitutes a
fraction of the market, diminishing their bargaining power when they individually negotiate
rebates. Furthermore, each Medicare drug plan must cover 6 protected drug classes (immune
suppressants, antidepressants, antipsychotics, anticonvulsants, antiretrovirals, and
antineoplastics) and 2 drugs in all other therapeutic classes, regardless of price.93,94
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American policies have drawbacks. While US insurers can negotiate discounts from list
prices, manufactures anticipate that purchasers will seek discounts and launch drugs at high list
prices. Manufacturers generally increase prices annually. Moreover, when negotiating discounts,
insurers lack a principle, method, or rule by which they can cap their purchase price, except
when they can substitute a comparable drug. The discounts that Medicare and Medicaid
negotiate are based on some index of US market prices or the best US price, but both are high
compared to prices in other nations. These practices diminish the value of using discounts to
reduce prices or spending. Likewise, in return for discounts, Medicaid includes all of a
manufacturer’s products in its formulary, even when they can procure comparable drugs at lower
prices.95 In return for obtaining discounts, insurers ordinarily must limit access to competing
products by not designating them as preferred products.
Learning from Germany
As US policymakers consider reforms, several strategies employed in Germany are worth
consideration

Pr

1) Enact Statutes that create incentives for manufacturers to negotiate prices.

Germany pays less for new drugs than the United States because manufacturers must
negotiate maximum reimbursement or lose access to a large, profitable market. During their first
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year, each new drug is evaluated in relation to the nearest comparable therapy. Starting in the
13th month, manufacturers will not be reimbursed at more than the cost of the most appropriate
comparator therapy, unless an independent assessment finds that the new drug offers added
medical benefit. The prices of new drugs with added benefit are negotiated by the GKVSpitzenverband and the manufacturer, and if they cannot agree, arbitrators set the price.

ev

The United States lacks general rules that create incentives for manufacturers to negotiate
prices or cap purchase prices in the absence of an agreement. Private insurers negotiate prices
without federal default rules. Manufacturers lack incentive to negotiate prices for Medicare drugs
outside of hospitals because Medicare must cover all drugs in 6 classes, regardless of their
price.93 Medicaid has a voluntary rebate program: Participating manufacturers agree to sell drugs
at a fixed rate discount set by statute or at their best market price. In return, Medicaid agrees to
purchase the manufacturer’s drugs, even when less expensive therapeutic alternatives exist.
Furthermore, several states require Medicaid to cover all drugs approved for treating cancer,
regardless of price.96
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The US insurers would be better able to negotiate prices if Congress enacted legislation
to create incentives for pharmaceutical firms to negotiate prices. For example, legislation could
grant Medicare and Medicaid the option to not cover drugs unless they are cost-effective, or to
pay no more than the appropriate comparator therapy, or to restrict its formulary to obtain
discounts. Private insurers adopting similar policies could also pay lower prices.
2) Free pricing at product launch and capped reimbursement after one year ensures rapid
access to new drugs.
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Germany encourages manufacturers to launch pharmaceuticals in Germany before or at
the same time as other European countries by allowing manufacturers to set launch prices,
thereby yielding rapid access to new drugs. After 1 year, Germany sets maximum reimbursement
to control spending. These policies have had their intended effect.97 Manufacturers generally
launch products in Germany before other European nations. Manufacturers have not withdrawn
drugs from the market after the first year, except for a few drugs which can be priced no higher
than the appropriate comparator therapy because they were found to lack added medical
benefit.41 If US insurers set maximum reimbursement rates for drugs starting 1 year after product
launch, that would control prices and spending without restricting access to new drugs, despite
having to pay high prices for the first year.
3) Capping reimbursement based on a new drug’s added medical benefit controls prices
and provides appropriate incentives for manufacturers.
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Germany incentivizes the development of improved therapies by reimbursing new drugs
no higher than the price of the comparator therapy, unless they yield added medical benefit. This
policy rewards manufacturers that develop new drugs with added benefit, while capping the
prices of other drugs.
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The US researchers have developed scales to assess the comparative value of drugs. The
American Society for Medical Oncology published a magnitude of clinical benefit scale to help
clinicians choose among competing therapies.98 The Institute for Clinical and Economic Review
evaluates the cost-effectiveness of drugs.99 Insurers can employ such information when
12
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negotiating prices.94 The United States, however, lacks 2 elements present in Germany: (1) an
independent institute to assess all new drugs and (2) legislation that caps drug reimbursement
based on the independent assessment of each new drug’s added benefit. Medicare, Medicaid, and
other federal programs could obtain lower prices if legislation capped purchase prices to no more
than their value, as determined by the independent assessment. Private insurers could achieve
similar results if they adopted analogous policies for their own purchasing. Alternatively,
legislation could require all insurers to assess a drug’s added benefit and set prices in line with
that assessment.

ev

4) Setting reimbursement based on a drug’s added medical benefit can be combined with
external reference pricing to yield prices comparable to what other countries pay.
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Germany employs 3 principles to set drug prices: (1) new drugs are not priced higher
than existing products, unless they provide added medical benefit; (2) new drugs with added
benefit receive higher prices than existing drugs; and (3) drugs with added benefit are reimbursed
in line with the amount paid by other European countries. The assessment of new drugs
determines whether the drug receives the same price as the existing comparator therapy, or a
higher price. For new drugs with added benefit, German reimbursement is determined by
negotiation, but must reflect reimbursement in 15 other European countries.
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German policy shows that countries can employ multiple price and cost control strategies
simultaneously and the United States can too. The United States can use an independent
assessment of a drug’s medical benefit to cap prices, while also employing external reference
pricing to ensure that US payments are not exorbitant compared to what other countries pay. At
the same time, the United States could also restrict any price increases or any price increases
greater than inflation.
5) External reference pricing should be based on net prices, not official prices.
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Germany mandates that prices of new drugs with added medical benefit are consistent
with reimbursement in other European countries. Virtually all European countries negotiate
confidential discounts from official price. Therefore, the GKV-Spitzenverband requires that
manufacturers disclose discounts, using this information when negotiating maximum
reimbursement. If manufacturers are unable to disclose discounts offered elsewhere in Europe, or
if the GKV-Spitzenverband does not find those disclosures credible, it estimates the discounts
based on its own information.
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In 2019 to 2020, Congressional Democrats100 and the former Trump administration100,101
each proposed employing an international price index to cap Medicare payment for drugs (while
allowing price increases for inflation). The Congressional proposal would require manufacturers
to provide drugs to private insurers at the same price if they did not successfully negotiate
another agreement. Under both proposals, the average price in selected countries would cap the
amount that Medicare would pay for drugs. Subsequently, the Trump administration
promulgated regulation that would set Medicare prices at the most-favored-nation price, namely,
the lowest price the drug is sold in any designated nation.100,102 The Biden administration and the
current Congress are considering both approaches as models for future reform.103 Both the
international price index proposal and most-favored-nation price regulation do not adjust official
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prices for the confidential discounts that European countries receive.104 Consequently, the United
States would still pay significantly more than Germany or other European countries do. If the
Biden administration and Congress pursue the idea of capping US prices based on prices in other
nations, they should look to net prices paid, adjusting official maximum reimbursement for
discounts and rebates.
6) Setting maximum reimbursement stops annual drug price increases.

er
r

ev

In the United States, manufacturers customarily raise drug prices annually, usually more
than the rate of inflation. Among US insurers, only Medicaid caps price increases greater than
the inflation rate. Germany precludes price increases after an initial price agreement between the
GKV-Spitzenverband and the manufacturer, unless, for example, new evidence leads to a revised
assessment of a drug’s added medical benefit. Recent US legislation would cap price increases
by taxing manufacturers for the full amount of any price increases greater than the rate of
inflation.105 German policy indicated that the US can go further and tax any unilateral prices
increases. Similarly, US private insurers could negotiate multiple-year contracts with fixed prices
to preclude annual price increases.

pe

7) Capping reimbursement can work in tandem with market competition where a choice of
therapies exists.
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ot

Opponents of price regulation often argue that prices should be set by market
competition, not regulation. In fact, price regulation and price competition can work in tandem.
Germany employs market competition when there is a choice of products. First, drugs with no
added benefit are assigned to a reference price group in which all drugs are reimbursed the same
amount, regardless of the manufacturer’s list price. Since patients will bear the difference
between the list price and amount reimbursed, manufacturers typically compete by lowering
prices. As a result, manufacturers adjust the list price of about 84% of drugs to no more than the
reference price.12 In addition, individual insurers often negotiate price discounts and purchase
drugs at less than the maximum reimbursement price. These discounts are frequently provided in
return for purchasing high volume. In 2015, discounts accounted for >10% of pharmaceutical
expenditures under health insurance. In a similar vein, the United States could employ market
competition to lower purchase prices even while it caps reimbursement.
8) Allowing affected parties to respond to expert assessment of added medical benefit helps
promote accountability.
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Independent assessment of a drug’s added medical benefit provides an evidence-based
method for capping prices. To reduce the risk that assessments and decisions might be flawed,
Germany allows manufacturers and other affected parties to comment on the independent
assessment before the G-BA decision and price setting through negotiation or arbitration. The
ability of affected parties to comment on the independent assessment ensures a transparent
process and political accountability. The US could incorporate a similar mechanism by using its
long-standing notice and comment rule-making process that the federal government employs
when it issues federal regulations. The Medicare program uses a similar process when it
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promulgates regulations for physician and hospital payment, reaffirming the feasibility of
implementing this type of system.

9) Arbitration of reimbursement disputes is a politically legitimate means to set prices in the
absence of a negotiated agreement.

ev

In Germany, if the manufacturer and GKV-Spitzenverband are unable to negotiate an
agreement, prices are set by arbitration rather than allowing the GKV-Spitzenverband to
unilaterally set the maximum reimbursement. Arbitration constitutes a politically legitimate
means to set prices in the absence of a negotiated agreement. The United States often uses
mandatory binding arbitration to resolve commercial and other disputes. It could also employ
binding arbitration to resolve disputes over drug pricing.
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10) Capping reimbursement in line with and independent assessment of each new drug’s
added medical benefit can avoid undesirable aspects of pharmaceutical cost controls that
characterize the U.S. and some other European countries.
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Germany’s pharmaceutical cost controls avoid problems that frequently occur in the
United States, such as high copayment and deductibles. German patients make only token
copayments when there is no choice of therapeutically equivalent drugs. Nor does Germany
exclude important new drugs from a formulary, nor restrict their access by placing them on a list
of nonpreferred drugs, as many insurers do in the United States. Germany also avoids certain
policies employed by other European countries. Unlike the United Kingdom, Germany does not
restrict access for 2 years after product launch.106 Additionally, it does employ cost-effectiveness
as a criterion to cap reimbursement, unlike the United Kingdom and the Nordic countries. 107
Conclusion: Moving Toward Reform in the United States
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Surveys have revealed that the US public perceives drug prices to be too high and that the
cost of medicines is difficult for patients to bear.108-110 In the past decade, both Democratic and
Republican members of Congress have proposed legislation to control pharmaceutical
spending.108 However, most of these proposals involved modest reforms that would nip at the
edges of the problem rather than create a system that would cap purchase prices. Recent
proposals also fail to employ health technology assessment as the means to control spending. 100
Currently, Congress appears to lack the political will to enact changes that would cap prices
nationally. Nevertheless, if drug prices continue to be a salient issue, there will be pressure for
Congress to intervene. Moreover, since 2006 Medicare has covered outpatient pharmaceuticals,
and according to one analyst, that might unleash “a predictable cycle of high costs, budgetary
pressures, and ultimately, federal price controls for prescription drugs.”112 When the political
opportunities for significant reform occur, Germany and other European countries provide
models of strategies to cap drug prices and spending from which US policymakers can learn. The
United States, of course, cannot adopt a health system of another country, but it can learn from
their experience and adopt certain of their strategies in its own system.
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Notes
a The

manufacturer must include data from all clinical trials conducted or commissioned. The
dossier must be usually submitted electronically to the G-BA at the latest at the time of first
placing the drug on the market. The dossier must specify: (a) approved indications, (b) medical
benefit, (c) medical added benefit compared to the appropriate comparator therapy, (d) number
of patients and patient groups for whom there is a therapeutically significant added benefit, (e)
cost for the therapy for the statutory health insurance, and (f) request for a quality-assured
application (SGB V, s 35a(1) sentence 3 numbers 1 to 6).

“The fixed amount for each drug in a reference price group (…) shall not exceed the highest
dispensing price of the lower third of the interval between the lowest and the highest price of a
standard package. At least one fifth of all prescriptions and at least one fifth of all packages must
be available at the fixed price. At the same time, the sum of the respective percentages of
prescriptions and packages that are not available at the fixed price must not exceed 160 percent
of its value.” (SGB V, s 35(5) sentence 4 [translation from German to English]).
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b

§ 7(2) of the AM-NutzenV states that “the benefit assessment examines whether an additional
benefit has been proven for the drug compared to the appropriate comparator therapy, which
additional benefit has been proven for which patient groups and to what extent, how the available
evidence is to be assessed and the probability of the proof being provided in each case”
(translation from German to English).
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c

d

ot

For orphan drugs, the added benefit is deemed to be proven by the marketing authorization; its
extent and probability are assessed based on the pivotal trials (SGB V, s 35a(1) sentence 11).
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